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One has t o  be audacious in one's reading, so that it becomes an intense deciphering. We need not 
be afraid of wandering, though one should read in terms of a quest. There always has beenfemi- 
ninity from time immemorial but it has been repressed. I t  has never been unnamed, only sup- 
pressed. But it constantly reappears everywhere. . . . {Law) is like history. It is organized so as 
t o  repress and hide its own origin which always deals with some kind offemininity.' 
There is an immediate and striking sense in which common law is tied to what are classi- 
cally projected as feminine principles. It is a tradition which has prided itself upon the 
particular character of its justice, the subjectivity - the discretion - of its judges, and the 
malleable and essentially cyclical quality of its rules. As an unwritten system of law, the 
tradition which John Selden explicitly termed "Our Lady the Common Lawv2 is a law 
without writing and so a law without law.3 For the Western legal tradition, from the Ten 
Commandments to the Twelve Tables, from the Corpus iuris to the Code civile, law was 
writing: ratio scripta meant law, written reason was a synonym for legality. The common 
law, however, resisted the imperative to codify, and while the law was gradually, indeter- 
minately, and haphazardly reported and collected into books, its sources and reason were 
neither conceived as the logic of the written nor represented as universal law. Rather than 
relying upon tablets, tables, or other inscriptions or reminders, the common law con- 
ceived its sources as oral or oracular and found its origins in nature or in the immemorial 
and indefinite web of practice continued since time out of mind. The source of the law 
was not writing, nor was it conceived as some form of exterior inscription but rather as an 
internal principle of unwritten recollection, a faith or heart or body that lived the law. In 
contemporary terms it could be said that the very concept of the unwritten tradition of 
customary law was embedded - both in theory and in practice - in relationships rather 
than abstractions, in indeterminacy rather than objectivity, and in analogy, image, or like- 
ness rather than rule. 
The metaphors of origin or genesis of common law were thus traditionally viewed as 
being markedly feminine. The earth, the land, life constantly gave birth to a law which 
was explicitly termed the lex terrae or law of the land. Its sources were native custom and 
colloquial norms "connatural to the   at ion."^ Nature herself was deemed the ultimate 
origin of rules that were older than the oldest human law. The concept of the immemorial 
as another reason or justification for law again linked common law to a mystic, ineffable, 
or non-institutional beginning, to an abyss of lost or indefinite time which would have 
been seen by contemporaries of the early doctrinal writers as distinctively, if not threat- 
eningly, feminine.5 The feminine, in short, was a sign of origin and it was also and 
inescapably a sign of the source of law. To the extent that the source of customary law 
was figurative, politically or empirically indistinct, the feminine representation of, or 
metaphor for, the origin of law also acts historically as a screen or image that distances, 
forgets, or represses the origin: the representation necessarily has as one of its functions 
that of symbolizing or veiling something which cannot be looked at directly, namely, a 
human origin which law or doctrine needs to hide or by other means to veil or d i~semble .~  
The feminine origin is thus conceived as a lost source, a veiled or absent beginning: the 
origin precedes the institution of law, and so law is deemed to displace or supercede the 
feminine which always came before and was less than the law. For much contemporary 
feminist legal theory the principal task of a feminist jurisprudence is that of recovering 
the lost origin or repressed feminine genealogy of law: "Somewhere every culture has an 
imaginary zone for what it excludes, and it is that zone we must try to remember today."' 
It is not, however, simply a question of disclosing or disinterring the other history or fem- 
inine metaphors of a particular system of law. It is rather that the repressed feminine 
principle returns throughout the law. Feminist legal theory thus traces the various femi- 
nine possibilities or forms of difference within the law to the ultimate end of subverting 
or deconstructing a system of governance that has historically and structurally privileged 
masculinity and the values associated with patriarchal government. 
This essay will trace the history and the contemporary forms of feminist legal theory 
and will endeavour to indicate through the example of feminist analyses of the law of con- 
tracts the practical political difference that feminism makes to the analysis of a body of 
substantive legal rules. Proceeding from the history of the repression of the feminine to 
the analysis of a feminist rewriting of a specific legal discipline obviously involves a series 
of choices and exclusions. Feminist legal theory has been a prolific genre of legal writing 
in America and latterly in Europe over the past two d e ~ a d e s . ~  The literature has been var- 
ied, wide-ranging, and frequently extremely radical both in relation to established legal 
institutions and within the feminist movement itself. While many would not agree with 
the more apocalyptic expressions of the political urgency of feminist legal philosophy 
or with the celebrated view of Ann Scales that "the life and death struggle is now,"' the 
claims of feminism are at the least dramatically subversive of the classical legal concep- 
tions of the rule of law, its method, style, reason, and claims to neutrality. In its strongest 
form, a feminist philosophy of law challenges the entire normative structure, the peda- 
gogic and the professional practices of the legal institution. It suggests that the differ- 
ences of gender are real differences, that "there is something of the other that cannot be 
transmitted unless there is a political revolution such that a masculine man will let go of 
his phallic position and accept, even without understanding, the possibility of something 
else."1° In Catharine Mackinnon's alternative formulation, "Women's situation offers no 
outside to stand on or gaze at, no inside to escape to, too much urgency to wait, no place 
else to go, and nothing to use but the twisted tools that have been shoved down our 
throats. . . . If feminism is revolutionary, this is why."" 
F E M I N I N E  GENEALOGIES A N D  PLURAL ~DENTITIES 
The first division of the law of persons, according to Bracton who here followed the 
Roman law, was between slave and free. Only secondarily were persons divided between 
male, female, and hermaphrodite. The first distinction arguably crosscuts the second, 
but Bracton immediately added that "women differ from men in many respects, for their 
position is inferior to that of men."12 Defined by reference to men, the feminine sex or 
female personality (femina or mulier) is never independently defined in classical law: in the 
strongest of senses female sexual identity was simply not a relevant facet of legal person- 
ality. Femininity was synonymous with complete absence of personality, such that in 
juridical terms the female was a chattel or thing, while in logic an argument adfeminam 
was an argument ad rem. Both in ecclesiastical and in civil law, in theology and jurispru- 
dence, the fate of women in law was that of a radical inferiority or structural subordina- 
tion that was deemed so natural as to deserve neither definition nor systematic elaboration. 
While the relation between the sexes was regulated most directly by ecclesiastical laws 
of marriage, civil law stated the principles of women's inferiority and their legal incapac- 
ity in direct and revealing forms. The Digest ofJzstinian had classically indicated that 
"women are debarred from all civil and public functions and therefore cannot be judges 
or hold a magistracy or bring a lawsuit. . . ."l3 Women were legally children with regard 
to civil functions, they were inferior and always in the power of men. In slightly wider 
terms, sex and disability were synonymous with femininity: women were said to be prone 
to seduction and to deceiving as well as to being deceived. Their sex was characterized by 
weakness, vulnerability, cunning, and dissimulation. Other terms that recur are frivolity 
and frailty as qualifications of a being that in theological terms lacked moral substance 
and was guilty of the first and worst of all sins, namely, the attempt by Eve to arrogate 
to herself knowledge of good and evil, powers that were not human but of the divinity.'* 
The values attributed to femininity or to women are not constant over the long time- 
spans of institutional histories, and it is important to note that values which one era 
viewed as essentially feminine might in a subsequent period be deemed intrinsically mas- 
culine.'> It seems nonetheless apparent that within the two laws of Rome, the canon law 
and civilian traditions, certain attributes or characteristics of femininity were to become 
significant commonplaces or topics of the legal tradition throughout its early modern and 
modern history. First, both in concept and definition, the legal tradition defined women 
in terms of their sexual or reproductive function: in crude terms nature was stated to have 
created women for the purpose of childbearing, and this characteristic of femininity was 
taken to be definitive of all others. For legal purposes the woman was a sign of exchange 
value within a masculine economy of property right and reproduction. The site of that 
economy was in theological and juridical terms the home (oeconomie), which lay in the 
power, or properly the "prerogative," either of the father or the husband. While there were 
various exceptions to this principle, such that, for example, a spinster or "feme sole" in 
her majority could by common law own property, make contracts, and inherit in her own 
right, the overwhelming concern of the law was to regulate and distribute the incidents 
of marriage. Even in a sympathetic account of the law, marriage was deemed to be the 
destiny of women: "All [women) are understood either married or to be married and their 
desires subject to their husband. . . . "l6 Second, the effect of defining women in terms of 
a sexually derived essence was that the biological subordination of women became exem- 
plary of a series of further political, cultural, and epistemological incapacities. Nature was 
thus held to preclude women from political office and public functions where civil law 
did not directly apply. Custom determined that women were confined to the tasks, the 
language, and the tutelage of the gynaeceum, of child-rearing or domesticity. Reason indi- 
cated that feminine logic was a slender form of understanding (tenuitate intellectus) and 
that women were prone to irrationality, passion, simplicity, and at worst to the corrupting 
or idolatrous dictates of sense and of flesh. In the conclusion to a book-length discussion 

of the legal incapacity of women, Lord Chief Justice Fortescue, in the latter half of the fif- 
teenth century, cites Saint Augustine directly to confirm that "as the flesh is to the spirit.. . 
the pre-eminence of the man over the woman seems to be comparable to the pre-eminence 
of the reasoning faculties over sensual appetites, or the soul over the body."17 In terms 
of ecclesiastical law the same set of binary oppositions can be found repeated in the view 
that the "empire of woman is against - is the subversion of - good order, equity and jus- 
tice. . . . Monstrous is the body of that commonwealth where a woman beareth empire for 
either it doth lack a lawful head, or else there is an idol exalted in the place of the true head. 
An idol I call that which hath the form and appearance but lacks the virtue and strength 
which the name and proportion do resemble and promise."1s 
In legal terms the lesser condition or inferiority of women in ecclesiastical and civil 
law came to be spelled out in a variety of different ways within local law, and the figures 
of theological and secular legal definitions of femininity came to be repeated at critical 
points in the development of the various traditions of common law. In France, according 
to Bodin and Hotman, the Salic law had immemorially held that women would never 
inherit and so could never govern any portion of the land of France.19 In England custom 
and precedent were held to have decided again and again that women could not enter 
public office or professional life, that English nature best fitted the female to domesticity, 
and that women were prone to deceive, to fabricate, and to confuse. It is indeed in terms 
of these characteristic incapacities that the modern judiciary, in England and in America, 
have variously denied women the status of persons,20 required corroboration of female 
testimony,21 presumed that domestic agreements were not legally e n f ~ r c e a b l e , ~ ~  desig- 
nated sexuality for the purposes of marriage in terms of genitalia,23 or determined that the 
pervasive "reasonable man" test of private and public law could not extend to any notion 
so contradictory as that of a "reasonable woman."24 The examples could be multiplied 
but the logic remains largely invariant. In Jex Blake v. Senatus Academicus of University of 
Edinburgh, at the end of the nineteenth century, Lord Neaves based a decision to exclude 
medical students from the defendant university on the strength of the argument that 
"there is a great difference in the mental composition of the two sexes, just as there is in 
their physical composition. . . . [Tlhey [i.e., women) have not the same power of intense 
labour as men have."25 In Viscountess Rhondda's Claim, Lord Birkenhead, then Lord Chan- 
cellor, was even more dramatic in the logic of his exclusion of the plaintiff from a seat in 
the House of Lords. She was not "disqualifed" from the exercise of a public function as 
was required by section 1 of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, for the sim- 
ple reason that disqualification required the removal of some prior entitlement. This the 
plaintiff could not argue, for a minor may grow up, a felon may be pardoned, a bankrupt 
discharged, "these things are possible in nature and permissible in law, but a person who 
is a female must remain a female till she dies."26 
The purpose of such illustrations is twofold. In the first instance, however much the 
law may declare a residual ability or internal capacity of evolution "in the light of chang- 
ing social, economic and cultural de~e lo~ments , "~ '  the inscription, constitution, and 
method of law within the Western tradition has been geared at a structural level to the 
definition and correlative exclusion of women as the binary opposite or other of masculin- 
ity. It is not simply that the feminine in law traditionally represented the fickle, fragile, 
and foolish, but that in an altogether stronger sense femininity was the flesh opposed to a 
masculine spirit, image to substance, emotive passion to rational will. A woman, accord- 
ing to the sixteenth-century humanistic lawyer Alciatus, was a confused man, and while 
the feminine might have a biological and indeed "bestial" essence, she also had an infinite 
variety of cultural attributes or accidents.28 In this respect it is politically and legally dif- 
ficult not to accept the depiction of the sheer weight of the juridical history of oppression 
offered by Catharine Mackinnon or the picture of a structure erected throughout the his- 
tory of Western jurisprudence effectively making women "uncivil" in the strict sense of 
being outside of the definition of legal subjectivity. As Julia Kristeva has remarked, "It is 
noteworthy to observe that the first foreigners to emerge at the dawn of our civilization 
are foreign women - the D a n a i d e ~ . " ~ ~  They bring with them a series of characteristics of 
the outlaw or stranger. These nomadic women are of uncertain origin, extraneous status, 
exiled, and close to madness. They are other in the sense of being excluded, itinerant, 
and far from home. In this context feminine subjectivity or women's experience can be 
defined in a preliminary and partial way as that of subjection, of oppression, and of 
silence. A feminist jurisprudence consonant with such a definition of women's experience 
could be said to analyse the "effects of law upon women as a class" and so concentrates 
upon certain collective features of widely varied experience of legal affects. 
The second reason for tracing, if only in minor detail, the extended history of subordi- 
nate feminine legal statuses is to advert to  certain contradictory features of the history 
depicted. In one aspect, which is closer to theological than to secular legal definitions of 
the feminine, the attributes of women are invested with extraordinary power. The other is 
always a threat, and the feminine is a double threat in being foreign or alien as well as 
being defined in opposition - and so in proximity - to masculinity. The feminine other is 
associated with nature, matter, body, sense, and flesh. Such forms of otherness obviously 
have the negative powers of their own exterior being. More than that, however, the law 
has tended to link women as nature to the sins of the flesh and the confusion of sense. It  
is women who have the power to understand the machinations of hidden things, to work 
wonders that bring harm upon men, to deceive, to fool, to betray, and to destroy. It  is 
this latter aspect of feminine power that deserves to be further reconstructed. If the his- 
tory of the legal tradition is a history of the repression of the feminine, it is repressed 
because it represents an unbearable threat, it is repressed because the law cannot bear to 
reexperience the trauma that had been captured in the figure of femininity. Repression, 
in other words, is neither conscious nor purposeless. It is rather the negative basis at the 
root of identity.30 Thus the contingency of the feminine establishes - by negation - the 
objectivity of the masculine, as similarly its indeterminacy grounds the certainty of its 
opposite, its difference lends symmetry and its dispersion unity to the antagonistic bearer 
or masculine vehicle of its repression. Two aspects of this process of the internalization 
and return of the repressed deserve analysis. First, the history of the repression of the fem- 
inine can be traced through the repressed texts and hidden figures of legal tradition: the 
ensuing analysis will thus briefly recall those texts that tradition and doctrine ignored or 
excluded. In a secondary sense the repressed is incorporated into or exists in a space 
within the subject, conceived either as the institution or as t r a d i t i ~ n . ~ ~  The existence of 
the repressed is an active contradiction of the unity, identity, or conscious volition of the 
legal subject, and feminism returns to claim the dispersion of the identity of "woman" 
quite as much as it denies the unity or coherence of the masculine form. A second and 
more substantive definition of feminist jurisprudence is thus one which moves beyond the 
expression of the collective experience or "different voice" of women to what Luce Irigaray 
has termed an ethics of sexual difference, namely the construction and inscription of dif- 
ferences, of feminine genealogies and of women's speech and writing within the rhetoric 
and the practice of substantive legal rights: the writing of the body or hcvitavefeininine is in 
this sense an expression of a cultural unconscious, of a repressed and so phantasmic real- 
ity, of a different law. 
In terms of the repressed tradition of feminine texts, the opening remarks as to the 
inherent if little acknowledged femininity of common or unwritten law can be signifi- 
cantly reinforced by considering the specific mythologies and substantive figures of women 
buried within the tradition. Irigaray has recently commented, in a text devoted to the 
"forgotten mysteries of feminine genealogies," that "in order to make an ethics of sexual 
difference possible, it is necessary to retrace the ties of feminine genealogies" in law as 
well as in religion, language, and philosophy.32 It  is necessary, in other words, to attend to 
the repressed of the tradition and to recover what remains of the speech of the repressed, 
of those who resisted, were excluded, or otherwise failed. In this respect the entire tradition 
can be followed in its obverse form through the various and numerous figures of excluded 
women. While it would be impossible to survey the full panoply of missing, excluded, 
or forgotten texts advocating feminine rights and women's differences, certain exemplary 
texts can be recalled. In one of the earliest texts of the common law tradition, Fortescue's 
De natura legis natarae (Of the nature of natural law) of circa 1466, the claim of a woman, 
the king's daughter, to inherit her father's kingdom is analysed in the form of a hypotheti- 
cal case brought by her against the king's brother and her own son, the king's grandson.33 
Although the eventual judgement in the case is wholly in favour of masculine succession 
to the throne, the treatise itself is devoted to denouncing women's claim to succession 
to public office and contains an elaborate and extensive discussion of theology, canon law, 
civil and common law on the nature and rights of women. These arguments will not be 
rehearsed here except for the purpose of making two points with regard to what may 
plausibly be termed a foundational common law text.34 
First, the whole impetus of Fortescue's analysis of the right of feminine succession to 
the throne is negative or suppressive. The daughter's claim is represented and justified 
in about a third of the textual space devoted to each of the alternative claims and rebuttals 
of the brother and the grandson. Nonetheless the daughter does make a case, from theol- 
ogy and law, in favour of feminine succession, arguing that the Bible allows such inheri- 
tance and that nature and secular law, logic and precedent, all allow women to govern. 
That case is rebutted at extraordinary length by the other litigants and by the judgement. 
What is remarkable is simply that such a topic is canvassed at such length in a treatise on 
the law of nature at the dawn of the modern common law tradition. Denial, or more tech- 
nically negation, represses and so incorporates that which is denied; it creates an interior 
space and in a sense imprisons that which is denied. The argument of De natura in this 
paradoxical sense recognizes and to a limited degree validates the claims of feminine suc- 
cession. In other words, there would be no need to expend such authorial or textual 
energy upon the refutation of the claim if women were not perceived as threatening or if 
their claim were genuinely absurd or legally ludicrous. The text is written by one of the 
early "authors," sages, or sources of the common law tradition, and the dedication of 
such a degree of space and erudition to the refutation of the claim of women to legal per- 
sonality and constitutional rights suggests both that women were a threat to the tradi- 
tion, and that their case was one which needed urgent settlement. 
Second, Fortescue's elaboration of the nature of natural law and of the daughter's claim 
to her father's kingdom is made via a series of images and invocations of an alternative 
tradition or feminine genealogy of law and of common law. Borrowing from the medieval 
tradition of Christian philosophy, and particularly from Boethius, Fortescue depicts the 
origin and "mother" of all law as being providence - Providentia - otherwise termed Fate 
or divine will. This mother gives birth to natural law which must remain a part of, or 
must participate in, its maternal law for the explicitly stated reason that "the offspring 
is a portion of the mother's entrails (portio est viscerzlm maternarzlm)."" This figure of femi- 
ninity at the source of law has a more concrete expression in the daughter of the law of 
nature, namely moral wisdom or Phronesis, who is stated to be the truth of justice and "is 
comely of face and beautiful of aspect."16 Justice herself is the genus of which law is the 
species. It is indeed from justice that the law gets its name, "for jus is so called from justi- 
Justice is part of the law of nature and she is also a woman who pronounces judge- 
ment upon all human actions and "who assigns to everyone their right."38 In making 
her claim to a right of succession the king's daughter can thus call upon an established 
tradition of feminine governance, and she does so to some effect in her argument before 
the imaginary court of the second book of De natzlra. She thus argues that the duty of 
royalty is a symbolic function and its specific tasks can be performed vicariously, that is, 
delegated to others. The symbolic function, however, is not simply something that women 
can perform, it is something that historically and conceptually women have performed 
better than men. She proceeds in the tradition of the "Querrelle des Femmes" to list the 
women who have governed or judged, fought and ruled in the history and mythology of 
the Western tradition. She invokes an alternative genealogy in which far from being the 
opposite of men, women were rulers, judges and monarchs with distinct and remarkable 
characteristics. In biblical terms, was there ever, she asks, a wiser judge than Deborah? 
Who ever waged wars of her people more bravely than Tomyris Queen of the Massagetae? 
Who ever subjugated nations with the sword more strenuously than Semiramis?. . . Doth 
not the kingdom of the Amazons also, which is always ruled by women, defend itself stoutly 
against all the lords of the world? Assuredly this parchment would not suffice to contain 
the names, were they recorded, of the noble women who have ruled nations with vigour and 
great ju~tice.~' 
The records have neither been kind to nor retentive of this history of feminine gover- 
nance and of illustrious and erudite women. Fortescue did not return to the issue in any 
of his later works, and the subsequent tradition tended to assume the accuracy of the the- 
ological and civil law arguments which Fortescue had recounted. The principal treatises 
on the constitution and the courts of England subsequent to Fortescue depict the domestic 
place and the political and legal exclusion of women as established facets of common law. 
Sir Thomas Smith, for example, simply follows Aristotle in depicting women as subordi- 
nate to men and assumes that in terms of common law the exclusion of women from 
inheritance and office depicted by the Salic (i.e., French) and Roman laws is as true of 
England and common law as it is of ~rance.*O Other more general works on the ecclesias- 
tical and civil polity, those of Hooker, Downing, and Ridley, as well as the more specific 
treatises on aspects of the jurisdiction and doctrine of common law seem happy to 
repeat expressions of policy that now appear as precedents.41 Only with the work of the 
scholar, antiquarian, and lawyer John Selden does the issue of feminine right reemerge as 
a substantive theme within common law. While certain legal and theological texts made 
incidental remarks or digressive comments on histories of feminine rule,42 the second 
forgotten - or, more accurately, repressed - text is Selden's Jani Anglorum (English Janus), 
a history of the other faces or the feminine forms of common law. 
Selden's text provides an extensive and erudite account of feminine genealogies at the 
source of common law. Dedicated - not without irony - to Janus, "King of Great 
Britain," the work consists of a series of narratives and myths, derived from fragments and 
scraps of the ancient constitution and government of Britain, "though injury of t ime..  . 
and loss through neglect have erased so much that I was not able to put upon the work 
the face of history."43 Janus is the god of doorways and gates, of entrances and the begin- 
nings of things. Janus is a god, in short, of orgins and sources. As regards "English- 
British" law, Selden depicts a genealogy that not only attributes the origin of common 
law to feminine sources but equally argues that common law allows women to inherit the 
crown and to participate in public office. At one level Selden repeats, though in greater 
detail, the feminine figures that Fortescue had used to depict the metaphysical origins of 
common law. Following the tragic drama of the Oresteia, the law is attributed originally to 
the Furies, the Goddesses of Justice who avenge the wicked and attend to the good. The 
first judges were thus women, the Semnai theia or Venerable Goddesses, before whom all 
judges and dispensers of law must pass.44 In conceptual terms the myth of the Furies, the 
daughters of necessity, of providence, or of fate, provides a remarkable figure for the rep- 
resentation of a feminine principle of justice in which a species of conscience plays the 
role of an internal law. The Furies avenge evil deeds by hidden means: the only intimation 
of the presence of the Furies is the onset of madness in their victim. Their law is inex- 
orable and they come by night, fearsome and invisible, to destroy those that have harmed 
their kin or offended against the laws of the blood. From these Furies, Selden argues, are 
descended the rulers and the lawgivers of England. 
In terms of British constitutional history, Selden subsequently lists the female monarchs 
of Britain, the illustrious women rulers from the memory of whose governance he can 
expound a view of the sanctity, foresight, and superiority of feminine rule. Adding to the 
list of the virtues of women's rule associated with biblical and historical rulers, with Deb- 
orah, Artemis, and the Amazonian women, he proceeds to recount the virtues of Martia, 
Boadicea, and Elizabeth and to suggest that in the light of such histories arguments 
against women's public role or governance are "mad rude expressions not unfitting for a 
Professor of Bedlam Again, the issue is not the substantive historical point of 
doctrine but rather the invocation of an alternative genealogy or of other sources and 
methods of common law that might reflect the role and rights of women. Selden expands 
the argument in favour of feminine succession to the crown, an argument that had also 
been forcefully put by the Scottish divine John Leslie in a series of works advocating the 
regency of Queen ~ a r ~ . * ~  The purpose or end of his argument is the conclusion that com- 
mon law has always allowed women not only to the throne but also in principle to politi- 
cal suffrage and public office.*' The feminine is the end of nature and, in the form of 
justice, it is the telos of law. In that latter aspect it is worthy of note that the legal advo- 
cacy of the feminine cause did not always or necessarily stop with the recounting of an 
alternative mythology or with a history of the "other face" or repressed and fragmentary 
narrative of feminine rule. Selden is perfectly explicit as to the substantive institutional 
and professional implications of feminine genealogies. They imply the independent suf- 
frage of women and access to political rights and legal capacities. O n  this point it is useful 
to return to a third text, the anonymously published work entitled The Lawes Resolutions of 
Womens Rights, which appeared in 1632 and is sometimes taken to represent the early 
emergence of a feminist movement in common law.48 
The Lawes Resolutions was subtitled The Lawes Provision for Woemen and the running 
head of the book was The Womans Lawyer. It  was an attempt to write a systematic treatise 
upon the second division of the law of persons, namely, that between male and female. Its 
purpose was to list all those laws that touched specifically upon the lives of women, for, as 
the author explains, 
methinks it were pity and impiety any longer to hold from them such customs, laws, and 
statutes, as are in a manner, proper, or principally, belonging unto them. . . . I will in this 
treaty with as little tediousness as I can, handle that part of the English law, which contains 
the immunities, advantages, interests, and duties of women, not regarding so much to 
satisfy the deep learned or searchers for subtlety, as woman kind, to whom I am a thankful 
debter by nature.49 
Again, at the end of the work, the point is made that the systematic presentation of all 
those "customs, cases, opinions, sayings, arguments, judgements, and points of learning" 
addressed to or "principally belonging to women" is a necessary exercise in relation to a 
knowledge which was not only "dispersed in our Law books" but also "heretofore. . . 
smothered, or scattered in corners of an uncouth language, clean abstruded from their 
sex. Which concealment, because it seemed to me neither just, nor conscionable, I have 
framed this work. . . ."'O The treatise details and endeavours to circumvent the law's 
restrictions upon and denigrations of women. I t  cites "our late. . . Queen Elizabeth"" as 
a bulwark against the oppression of women, and in keeping with such an expression of 
purpose it analyses the variety of laws touching upon or threatening women in terms of 
the best manner of manipulating them or, by novel fictions or by reference to alternative 
customs and sources of law, avoiding their adverse effects. 
The Lawes Resolutions could accurately be described as attempting to take apart or to 
deconstruct the legal fictions that constructed the accessory place of women within com- 
mon law. I t  traces the legal surfaces of gender in terms of the figures of femininity that 
are spread diversely across the texts of common law. Following the classical institutional 
divisions, the study of the law relating to the female sex moves from issues of personality, 
to things and finally actions or at least the avoidance of actions being brought against 
women in the form of dispossession of property, loss of dower, and similar adversities. The 
first two books thus treat principally of the legal incapacities of the female sex. Such inca- 
pacity is most notably the product of marriage by virtue of which at common law the 
wife loses her personality and becomes a part of the husband, a member of the household 
or family, of that institution of which the husband is head: "It is known to all, that 
because women lose the name of their ancestors, and by marriage usually are transferred 
into another family" they cannot inherit. Nor can married women make contracts. They 
can neither alienate nor receive property, nor can they bring an action or hold a public 
office or dignity. The inequalities of the law are listed and the iniquities of women's infe- 
rior condition are deplored. In particular the author berates and suggests ways around the 
various legal provisions that either denigrate women or threaten their limited spheres of 
freedom. Thus it is pointed out that where women do retain an independent personality 
it is normally to their disadvantage, the most notable of which was that the married 
woman could be tried and punished for criminal causes. If she killed her husband it was 
petty t r ea~on . ' ~  The examples could be multiplied but it will suffice simply to note that 
especial attention was given to the inequity of the husband's legal power to beat the wife, 
and to the limitations upon dower. As regards the former, The Lawes Resolutions suggests 
that the wife similarly terrorize the husband: "Why may not the wife beat the husband, 
what action can he have if she do?" The author then adds the plea that "God send women 
better company."53 As regards the rights of the widow, the suggestions are more interest- 
ing and radical. Not only does the text list all the ways in which the wife may lose her 
dower - that third of her husband's property which she has use of for het natural life - 
but it also suggests that loss of the husband is no great disadvantage: 
Consider you [i.e., widows] how long you have been in subjection under the predominance 
of parents, of your husbands, now you be free in libertie, and freeproprii izlris at your own Law; 
you may see that maidens and wives vows made upon their souls to the lord himself of heaven 
and earth, were all disavowable and infringible by their parents or husbands. . . . but the vow 
of a widow, or of a woman divorced, no man had power to disavow. . . ."54 
In short, there is ample evidence within the legal tradition of a history of represssed 
texts and forgotten or failed arguments for the constitutional recognition of the full legal 
personality of women. I t  is significant also that such texts do not predicate their argument 
as to the status of women in law upon the notion of the potential equality of women but 
rather upon the argument that there is a distinct tradition of women lawgiving and of 
feminine rule. In other words, the legal status of women was not a question of the equal- 
ity of women nor was it a matter of the homogeneous recognition of the status of a single 
group or category. The Lawes Resolutions did not analyse the uniform effect of law upon 
women but rather collected together the dispersed and distinct provisions affecting the 
diverse statuses, periods, and fortunes of femininity in common law. In specifically doc- 
trinal terms, women were never a singular category but always a plurality dispersed over 
a series of temporal categories - at nine years of age she might have dower, at twelve she 
may consent to marriage, at fourteen she is at discretion and may choose a guardian, at 
twenty-one she may alienate her lands5' - and according to several relationships, such as 
infancy, virginity, wardship, concubinage, elopement, marriage, separation, and widow- 
hood. What  could in one sense be viewed as a hierarchical nonrecognition of femininity 
as either a gender or cultural attribute could in the more radical context of the Womans 
Lawyer also connote the pursuit of a complex of differences. I t  suggested eventually not 
merely that women rectify or variously assert their equality, capacity, or difference in rela- 
tion to specific provisions but also that women could have their own unique law, that 
they could eventually be proprii iuris or actors according to a law that was peculiarly, dis- 
tinctly, and uniquely their own. Two observations can be made with regard to this 
account of the dispersed character or diverse identity of the feminine. 
First, the history briefly outlined tends to confirm the genealogical view that the 
legal tradition carries within itself a series of very different figures, values, and terms for 
femininity. These may well be repressed, hidden, and often unamenable to historical 
proof for reasons which were specified very early in the modern tradition by the feminist 
author Judith Drake: 
I cannot prove all this from Ancient records; for if any Histories were anciently written by 
women, time and the malice of men have effectually conspired to suppress them, and it is not 
reasonable to think that men should transmit, or suffer to be transmitted to posterity, any 
thing that might show the weakness and illegality of their title to a power they still exercise 
so arbitrarily and are so fond 
What  is peculiarly significant about such lost or failed texts is that they can indicate not 
simply the diversity of or differences between women but also that within the tradition 
there are many instances or periods in which femininity was conceived and figured differ- 
ently. I t  shows that contemporary culture, including often contemporary feminist culture, 
is remarkably limited or narrow in its perception of the tradition and of the values that 
law attributes to or associates with women: "The contemporary practice in many fields of 
cultural studies of considering only the most recent historical periods threatens to trap 
us in an extraordinarily narrow definition of culture, leaving us with an impoverished set 
of possibilities for representing gender difference, or even indifferen~e."~' History, con- 
ceived as the genealogical tracing of the infinite strands that compose the temporality of 
the present, does not constitute unitary identities but rather dissipates the singular and 
homogeneous, the author, subject, origin, and cause, in favour of a plurality of corporeal 
styles, inscriptions, and personae of gender and sexuality. "Woman," as Lacan laconically 
observed, "does not exist."58 Nor does "the experience" of women outside of the construc- 
tion of gender in historically and politically specific contexts: 
The appearance of substance is precisely that, a constructed identity, a performative accompiish- 
ment which the mundane social audience, including the actors, come to believe and perform in 
the mode of belief. Gender is also a norm that can never be fully internalized; the "internal" is 
a surface of signification, and gender norms are finally phantasmatic, impossible to embody.>' 
Thus in contemporary feminist jurisprudence plurality and intersection become impor- 
tant foci which crosscut the traditional categorizations of gender: women's class, colour, 
creed, sexual orientation, and ethnicity are as significant and compelling as the imaginary 
unity or culturally attributed classification according to gender alone.60 
The refusal to limit, to constrain, or to juridically define the feminine or woman as 
either unity or essence has a variety of political and jurisprudential consequences. In the 
work of a number of contemporary feminisms it suggests a transition from a view of the 
feminine as simple difference or as the other of masculinity, associated with those values 
that the masculine lacks, to a perception of a contingent and future difference that exists 
outside of or beyond the binary hierarchy of gender.61 The feminine is represented as 
plural and as changing, as fluid and associated with shifting and unequal values over time. 
In a political sense the feminine may well be associated with opposition to the masculine 
imposition of gender identities, and the recollection of feminine genealogies is here also 
the invocation of another law associated specifically with repressed traditions of resis- 
tance. In this context, Irigaray has continuously sought the historical emblems or mythi- 
cal figures of an alternative order or law of the city. The Oresteia, Antigone, and Aphrodite 
are all replayed in terms of the representation of a femininity that exceeded the masculine 
order of law and imposed a respect for values associated with the natural environment, 
with the body, with the relation of mother to daughter, and with the spiritual as well as 
the secular. She invokes a law which was and could yet be consonant with sexual differ- 
ence and with an ethics and legality which recognized and permitted that d i f f e r e n ~ e . ~ ~  I t  
is not simply that feminine sexuality is plural or "is not one" but rather that the refusal to 
identify and confine the feminine acts as a possible resource for the rewriting of the laws 
resolutions of women's rights. In other words, history has variously identified the femi- 
nine with particular values and traits. The politics of gender consists in large measure of 
deconstructing these traits, of treating them as contingent and so facilitating an order and 
law that could genuinely accommodate difference as opposed to treating difference as a 
species of subjection or subordination. To elaborate this thesis it may be helpful to analyse 
a specific body of common law rules, and to this end the next section will move to briefly 
sketch the potential impact of feminist legal theory upon the mundane workings of the 
law of contract. 
As a political intervention into the interpretation and practice of law, feminist jurispru- 
dence is concerned both with the theoretical analysis of the legal construction of gender 
and with the empirical analysis of the effects of law upon women. The latter concern has 
been a crucial aspect of feminist method in the sense that the analysis of how legal inter- 
vention or lack of intervention ignores, excludes, defines, restrains, or burdens women's 
lives is both an intensely personal and a deeply political issue. For feminist legal scholar- 
ship, the starting point for both empirical and theoretical analysis lies in the politics of 
personal experience: the effect of law upon women is initially a biographical and sociolog- 
ical question, a matter of the bodies, the pleasures and pains, the relationships, the memo- 
ries, the intentions, the frustrations, the successes, and the failures of women's lives.63 
This recourse to the diverse narratives of individual and collective experiences has been a 
signal facet of feminist legal method: it listens to the personal, attaches value to emotions, 
reinvests the bodily with significance, and more expansively challenges the abstraction, 
the proclaimed objectivity, universality, neutrality, and value-freedom of legal analysis.64 
The very form of law's representation, its impersonal voice and normatively distanced rep- 
resentations of relationships, its stylistic deletion of the first person singular from the law 
student's text, are all manifestations of a species of sexual tyranny that works through the 
form of written law.65 
The feminist concern to reassert the private domain as a site of political struggle, to 
make the politics of the gynuecezlm, of domesticity and reproduction, of relationships and 
of love, visible as dimensions of the public sphere, has involved a considerable overturning 
of traditional legal boundaries, styles, and systems of classification. One characteristic 
of feminist legal method has thus been a trajectory of displacement in which experience 
challenges abstraction, contingency - touch, dependence, and uncertainty - opposes 
determinacy, the play of language, the polysemy of meaning, and the politics of style also 
subvert the grand reasons and the untroubled references of juridical prose. Aligned with 
practices as diverse as consciousness raising, oral history, mythology, biographical narra- 
tive, poetry, and e'crit~refeininine,~~ the initial and continuing stake of feminist method as 
the inscription, the recollection and the expression, of experience is the reassertion of 
feminine subjectivities. I t  challenges the legal construction of the feminine body and its 
subjectivity. In Cixous's words, 
This flesh that's been superhistoricized, museumized, reorganized, overworked, is feminine 
flesh; in the "woman" projected by the Law, wounded by the same strokes of the censor that 
tailor an imaginary cut from a pattern - more or less skintight, clinging, incarcerating - for 
every woman; this little culture-sized "woman" encounters the singular life-sized woman.. . 
different as one text is from an~ther .~ '  
In synoptic terms, "flesh is writing, and writing is never read: it always remains to be 
read, to be studied, sought, in~ented."~ '  In short, the body is the unconscious and it 
presses endlessly to impose its content, its "wild and populous texts," across the barrier 
of (legal) consciousness. 
The return of the repressed, in both biographical and sociological terms, becomes a 
problem for lawyers only to the extent that either the style or the expression of the experi- 
ences of injustice can be made to appear in the languages of law.69 ~ e g a l  rules encode the 
feminine and construe gender across the discourse, the divisions, categories, and reasons 
of law. Sexual identities are cast and exchanged across the semiotic fields of legal meaning. 
Both access to and the power to change the attribution and repetition of these identities 
depends upon access to the textual system that produced them. Such access is complex 
in the sense that the discourse of law has always already demarcated and defined the val- 
ues, procedures, and content of such textual identities. It has already determined the 
normative character and content of the feminine or of "woman" and so placed feminist 
jurisprudence and feminine experience in the position of the stranger, the newcomer, 
the chimera, and quite frequently the irrational. The law, one might say, is already con- 
tracted to the opposition of the sexes. It is already contracted to a language, to meanings, 
procedures, and rules which predetermine the position of feminine identity and fre- 
quently exclude women literally, legally, and linguistically from the major sites of politi- 
cal expression. It is further contracted to a particular set of procedures for hearing and 
judging disputes between subjects and across the divisions of gender. This prior contract 
or antecedent bond, this conjunction or espousal of an instituted division or separation 
of identities comes to appear as a model for sociality as a whole. 
Feminist analyses of the common law of contracts return in principle to the concep- 
tions of relationship that contracts imply. What the revolutionary Russian jurist Pashuka- 
nis termed the "contractual form of human relationship" and attributed to the legal 
expression - and embodiment - of the exchange of co rnm~d i t i e s ,~~  can be more exten- 
sively reformulated in feminist jurisprudence in terms of a longer history of the exchange 
of subjects within an economy of sexual reproduction. The contractual form of human 
relationship is a socially determined relationship between legally defined persons, and it 
is simultaneously a formalization and a diminution of that relationship or of those per- 
sons. The contract is the form in which the subject writes the law.'l In its earliest form 
within the Judaeo-Christian tradition, it is Moses who covenants for the people of Israel 
and places the tribes of Israel in a restrictive or contracted relationship with the "one 
god" to the exclusion of all others, including, and by no means accidentally, the feminine 
Egyptian god Osiris represented by the golden calf: "What Moses condemned in con- 
demning the idolaters, was, in historical terms, the cult of maternal feminine divinities, 
and the incestuous fertility rites which accompanied such Along with the prohi- 
bition of the Egyptian goddess, Moses bans the multiple figurations of hieroglyphics, 
the inner Egypt of the Sphinx, of phantasms and enigmatic icons, and replaces these 
imaginary realms with the letter and the law of the father. It is noteworthy not only that 
the contract was a jealous one, that it excluded other gods and peoples not party to it - 
strangers - but also that it was preceded by a period of isolation or separation of the sexes: 
the men were forbidden to lie with their women prior to their meeting with God: one con- 
junction should not be confused with another. Further, it was Moses, father of the tribe, 
a man among men, who made the contract for the people and brought back the written 
law. The archetypal legal contract - compact, pact, or covenant - was definitively hierar- 
chical, doubly exclusive in being monotheistic as well constrictively unilateral, and arguably 
directly misogynistic in denying all cults or myths of feminine deities as well as the rites 
and the figures, the linguistic and imagistic phantasms, that accompanied such rites. It 
was in theological terms a marriage: one party promised to govern and the other to obey, 
one to give and the other to receive, one to act and the other to react, one to lead and one 
to serve. In short the contract was designed to express faith in a hierarchical system of 
belief and in a tabular or scriptural form of law. 
The theological model of contract is predicated upon a promise made vicariously with 
God. It is operative upon the fiction that the contracting subjects created the authority 
which, paradoxically, both preceded them and constituted them as subjects. Within the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition the authority which the contract fictively or mythologically 
established instituted a patristic power. The contract authorized God the father. It autho- 
rized an absolute power, and that power both created and passed through the social in the 
specific form of a series of further paternities: the king, the bishop, the judge, the father, 
the husband, the son. In terms of the modern legal tradition, the patristic structure of the 
giving of the law, the decalogue, is repeated in secular theories of the institution of pro- 
fane law through a social contract establishing explicitly a fraternity and not a sorority. To 
understand the conception of relationship that underlies the political philosophy of the 
social contract requires a return to the ecclesiastical model upon which it is based. The 
social contract is again, as Carole Pateman has illustrated, a contract between men which 
fictively establishes a "Civil Parent," a paternal power modelled upon the divine family 
and eternal father.73 The social contract, in short, establishes, first in spiritual law and 
latterly in secular law, the transmission of power from the patriarch to the king to the father 
by means of natural law. Writing a century before the publication of Robert Filmer's Patri- 
a r a ~ h a , ~ ~  the Anglican divine Calybute Downing attributed the power of the domestic and 
the social father directly to nature: "In the state of innocency there was superiority, not only 
betwixt man and all other creatures, but also betwixt man and woman.. . both patria potes- 
tas [the absolute power of the father within the family] and regiapotestas (the extension of 
the former to many families) being part of nature."'> Nature or Filmer's ancestral father, 
the patriarch or paterpatride, transmit the power invested in them by virtue of an original 
contract according to a law of paternal succession which time turns into nature. 
It takes little historical analysis to establish that the law of contract is modelled upon 
and emulates an ecclesiastical contract, that the spiritual bond or oath precedes and deter- 
mines the secular. What is interesting from the perspective of feminist jurisprudence is 
not, however, the historical predominance of the patristic contract and the polity which it 
both institutes and represents. I t  is rather that a close reading of contemporary contracts 
can reconstruct the historical repression of femininity within the putative freedom of pri- 
vate law. Feminist method initially poses the question of the effect of law upon women, 
and it has thus to be stated initially that from an empirical perspective the legal model 
of contractual relation neither expresses the experience of women nor in all probability 
plays any very significant role in the regulation or sanctioning of the relation between the 
sexes.76 The initial and most devastating observation is simply that the patristic character 
of the social contract has meant the exclusion of women from the realm of contracts. In 
historical terms married women lacked contractual capacity because they had no legal 
personality independent of their husbands. In contemporary common law, the wife still 
lacks capacity in the domestic sphere, and it is instructive to look briefly at the language 
of noncontractual relations in the early twentieth-century decision that reiterated this 
point in its modern vestments. 
According to Lord Atkin in Balfaur v. Bavour domestic promises between spouses are 
"outside the realm of contracts altogether." The reason he offers for this precedent is that 
"natural love and affection" lie at their basis and natural love and affection "count for 
nothing in these cold Courts." He proceeds subsequently to offer the remarkable view that 
"the parties themselves are advocates, judges, Courts, sheriff's officer and reporter. In 
respect of these promises each house is a domain into which the King's writ does not seek 
to run, and to which his officers do not seek to be admitted."77 According to Duke LJ the 
enforcement of domestic promises would 'go to the very root of the relationship.. . and be 
a fruitful source of dissension and quarrelling," while Warrington LJ is even more explicit 
with regard to the incapacity of the wife: she could "never have intended to make a bar- 
gain which could be enforced in law."" The story that the judgements tell is one which 
opposes the legal relation to the private relation, the public sphere to the home, and the 
written language of law to the emotive, ephemeral, and little heard language of love. 
Such romantic justifications for the decision, however, both belittle the social value of 
 relationship^^^ and belie the effect that the judgement will have upon women by virtue 
of the radically hierarchical and often violent nature of the judge, enforcer, and reporter 
in the domestic court, namely, the familial lawgiver, the father and husband. As Mary 
Astell remarked as early as 1700, the more plausible explanation of such limitation is 
that "covenants between husband and wife, like laws in an arbitrary government, are of 
little force, the will of the sovereign is all in all. Thus it is in matter of fact. . .men will 
happily sign articles (relating to property and goods) but then retract them because being 
absolute master, she and all the Grants he makes her, are in his power."80 
The legal unconscious is here quite evidently populated by women: that which the law 
cannot recognize is explicitly if opaquely subjected to another law, the law of the father, 
which also becomes the law of the husband. In contemporary terms, the doctrinal separa- 
tion of contract from marriage and the refusal of doctrinal writers to examine the gen- 
dered character of contractual and noncontractual relations leaves feminist jurisprudence 
with the critical role of recollecting and representing the relationships that the law of con- 
tracts either hide or reformulate. In an inventive analysis of American impossibility doc- 
trine, Mary Joe Frug indicates the striking sexual metaphors used in what English law 
categorizes as cases of frustration of contract. She proceeds to allude to the possibility of 
exploring the parallels between impossibility doctrine and the development of divorce 
and annulment law. 
Like impossibility doctrine, the function of annulment and divorce is specifically to excuse 
performance of obligations imposed by the contractual relations of the parties. But the analo- 
gies between these fields have historically been foreclosed to contract disputes because of the 
segregation of the legal subject areas8' 
This segregation has a decidedly gendered character and the suppression or simple igno- 
rance of that character facilitates the institution of a law of obligations which has neither 
any historical sensibility nor any grasp of the reasons and contexts that generated its cate- 
gories. 
Frug's analyses of the method, figures, and substantive effects of contract doctrine 
point perhaps unwittingly to a deeper or more permanent relation between the gender 
of contracts and the law of marriage. As has been argued, one level of this parallel is his- 
torical and follows the classical lineage from the first covenant to the contemporary (cor- 
porate) contract. What is significant about that lineage is that it brings with it a model 
of contractual relationship which will always hide - in the distance of the origin - the 
place of the feminine within the relationships of contracting. The social contract literally 
denies the civility of women and institutes a law which ignores the gender of persons by 
simply legislating the normative, or better the coercive, power of the masculine, which 
is to say of a personality or legal subjectivity without any conception of the legal existence 
of another sex, without any recognition of sexual difference as a structure of social rela- 
tions. Implicit, masked, or suppressed in that legislation of a purportedly neutral or 
sexless identity is also the gender-specific though unconscious representation of relation: 
as early as Bracton, the model of gift and of contract was binary and oppositional, namely, 
something certain (certa yes) was to be passed between the contracting parties, who were 
divided between sender and recipient or between animzls donandi and animzls recipiendi. 
The best evidence of contractual intention was writing.82 In short, the contract divides 
between the active and the passive, masculine and feminine, inside and outside, and 
offeror and offeree. 
The contemporary law of contracts retains that language, amongst other things, in the 
notion that the offeror is master of the contract: the offeror can determine both the method 
and the substance of acceptance. One example of the gendered implications of the relation 
between the master and the recipient of the offer in the formation of the contract can be 
taken from the apparent anomaly of the postal rule. A considerable academic literature as 
well as a substantial body of Anglo-American contracts doctrine has built up around the 
anomalous rule that where an offer is made and accepted by letters sent through the post, 
the contract is completed the moment the letter accepting the offer is posted, even though 
it never reaches its destination. Without being drawn into the detail of debates surround- 
ing the postal rule, it is generally deemed to have originated in 1818 in the decision of 
Adams v. L i n d ~ e l l , ~ ~  a decision which concerned delay in the delivery of the offer by virtue 
of the careless misdirection of the letter by the offeror. The decision was justified in that 
case by reference to the need to indicate some cutoff point in relation to the communica- 
tion necessary for the formation of a contract. Later decisions have doubted the wisdom 
of arbitrarily and universally favouring the offeree in cases involving the post, one deci- 
sion going so far as to describe the rule as a "museum piece." Academic commentary has 
also tended to be alternately incomprehending of the rule and hostile to its c~ntinuance. '~ 
Although the rule is depicted as an anomaly and is in most quarters generally accepted 
to lack any rational justification, it is also resignedly recognized that the rule will stay.'> 
What fuels such resignation and a more general incomprehension of the rule is simply 
that there is neither any logic to its application - it does not apply to more recent forms 
of indirect communication - nor any significant justification for its continued use: it is 
quite simply an anomaly that has become a precedent. 
Ironically the postal rule considerably predates the decision in Adams v. Lindsell and 
can be explained by reference to the repressed gendered relation between offeror and 
offeree. The postal rule is an allegory of the paternalistic protection of the feminine 
offeree. In doctrinal terms the need to allocate specific rules governing contracts made 
between absent parties had a peculiar role to play in relation to marriage contracts. The 
contract of marriage was the most significant and often the only contract that a woman 
would make. I t  was not, however, a contract that she could enter independently or with- 
out the consent of her father or guardian, so her acceptance of an offer or proposal of mar- 
riage was only one element in the exchange of promises and property that comprised 
the full marriage contract. Much of the law surrounding the contract of spousals thus pro- 
tected the parental interest in the exchange and there was, for example, a peculiarly 
detailed law of defamation which allowed actions to be brought against anyone who com- 
municated information that might prejudice the marriage.86 Similarly stringent regula- 
tions surrounded abduction and e l~pement .~ '  Within this legal context the consent of the 
woman to the offer of marriage was of interest to a network of further contractual or pro- 
prietary relations instituted around the marriage. Most notably the father of the woman 
would have promised either money or property to the prospective suitor and the accep- 
tance of the proposal would thus complete or render legally enforceable the transaction 
between the groom and father-in-law.88 The consent of the woman to the marriage was, 
however, necessary and raised peculiar legal problems where the spousals contract was 
made between absent parties, by messenger or by letter. The law governing the formation 
of the contract was ecclesiastical law and it had its roots in civilian d~c t r i ne . ' ~  If the 
offeror sent the offer by messenger or letter, does the woman have the capacity to utilize 
the same form of acceptance? According to the earliest treatise on the issue, she does have 
that capacity - it is granted to her by the offeror - and may accept either by messenger 
or letter. As to when the contract is completed, the answer is that the contract is formed 
and binding upon the expression of consent to the messenger or the posting of the letter. 
Henry Swinburne writes "that there is mutual agreement at one instant.. . because the 
party which did first consent is still presumed to continue and persevere in the same mind, 
until the time of the other's consent."90 The consent of the other is the consent of the 
woman; she is to be paternalistically protected by the rule or fiction that the sending of 
the acceptance is also its delivery. While Swinburne suggests that the fiction is justified 
by the power of the offeror's intention, by the general rule that the expression of intention 
is to be taken to continue constantly unless explicitly revoked, the obverse of this power 
of the offeror's intention is arguably the insignificance of the offeree's acceptance. It is par- 
asitic upon a series of transactions between men and upon communications between the 
father-in-law and the son-in-law in which the offer made to the woman is also the accep- 
tance by performance of a unilateral contract with the father-in-law. The acceptance of the 
offer brought by messenger or letter carrier is secondary and accidental to other transac- 
tions. The woman's acceptance or voice is tenuous and accessory: the acceptance concerns 
nothing more significant in legal terms than a relationship between the sexes, a love either 
consummated or thwarted, the life, destiny, or fate of a legally subordinate being. 
The example of the postal rule illustrates and supports the argument pursued by a 
number of feminist legal theorists who consistently maintain that the purportedly 
abstract and normative character of legal rules in a discipline such as contract simply 
suppresses the relationships and the gender of the contracting parties. The rules and the 
decisions are stories of power and of subjection. They are, however, presented in the 
reporting and representation of law in the guise of neutrality, detachment, and normativ- 
ity, separated from their context and bereft of the passions, commitments, and differences 
that constituted the relational or living content of their conflicts. The identity and rela- 
tions of the sexes are deferred, yet "this deferral is not neutral. By confining issues that 
particularly concern women to domestic relations or sex discrimination courses, casebooks 
combine with standard law school curriculums to perpetuate the idea that women's inter- 
ests are personal, concerning only themselves or their families."" Not only does the 
abstraction of legal content deny or suppress the gender of relationships but the very form 
of legal analysis refuses to admit the appropriation and perpetuation of a series of gender- 
specific values as the correlative of legal reason and its appropriate method. In Clare Dal- 
ton's analysis of nonmarital cohabitation contracts, she thus concludes that deconstruction 
reveals 
the world of contract doctrine to be one in which a comparatively few mediating devices are 
constantly deployed to displace and defer the otherwise inevitable revelation that public can- 
not be separated from private, or form from substance, or objective manifestation from subjec- 
tive intent.. . . [Wle can neither know nor control the boundary between self and other.92 
The analysis of repressed elements of gender in the law of contracts raises a series of fur- 
ther issues for feminist jurisprudence. The contractual form of human relation suppresses 
the feminine in the sense of regulating a public domain which either ignores the sexual 
identity of persons or by way of the doctrine of incapacity excludes women. Further, at 
the level of method, the contractual form of relation suggests that social relations are sep- 
arate from and largely antithetical to private relations. The legal relation of contract 
explicitly excludes that series of attributes or values which contemporary culture associ- 
ates with femininity. The contractual relation is archetypally constructed in writing 
between autonomous individuals. I t  is rights orientated, formalistic, and independent of 
context. It has, in short, the moralistic attributes which contemporary feminist legal soci- 
ology would characterize as masculine and oppose to the ethical values of the feminine, 
based according to Carol Gilligan and others upon care, relational networks, human con- 
sequences, particularity, and the uncertain and fragmentary growth of spirit in concrete 
 context^.^' Contract doctrine, for Frug, is "like a phallus. . . . singular, daunting, rigid 
and cocksure."94 The feminist analysis of contracts would thus suggest a radical rewriting 
of contracts and of the procedures for their interpretation, a rewriting which would take 
account of the feminine and of the impact of contracting upon women. I t  would suggest 
an alternative vision of social relationships and of human attributes in which the values 
associated with multiple and continuing relationships, with an ethics of the particular, a 
legality of the contingent, and the justice of immediate relationships would play a part in 
the process of social reproduction. 
The articulation of reformist demands in relation to contracts doctrine or in relation 
to other spheres of substantive law does not resolve the issue of the specific place, lan- 
guage, and method of a feminist legality. In one respect this may be a virtue of feminist 
theory, namely, that it refuses the universalizing character of positivistic jurisprudences, 
the political imperialism of liberal legal theory, and the vacuous abstraction of dogmatic 
theologies of law which make no effort to relate the categories of juristic thought to the 
experiences of institutional life.95 It is perhaps enough to trace the repression of the femi- 
nine, to voice the experiences of that repression, and at the level of theory to continuously 
deconstruct the dogmatic categories of an inherited law. The jurisprudence of difference 
would here be a jurisprudence of fragments, of the relics, repetitions, and repressions of 
customary law. I t  would be an oppositional and subversive enterprise at the boundaries 
of traditional jurisprudence and in the margins of professional legal practice. For the very 
reason that such a position, however numerous the women professionals and however 
vocal the representatives of the feminist cause in law, would still represent the feminine 
as an oppositional category, as stranger or other, within the inexorable repetitions of the 
law: "To claim a right to subjectivity and to freedom for women, without defining the 
objective rights of the feminine genre, appears to be an illusory solution to the historical 
hierarchy between the sexes and risks subjecting women to the power of an empty affir- 
mation. . . ."96 
The argument presented by Irigaray, Cixous, and other French feminists has always, 
perhaps surprisingly, had a focus upon law and upon the qualities and the literary repre- 
sentations of justice. Irigaray has recently devoted two works to the elaboration of a the- 
ory of feminist legality - Le temps de La d$$~eence (1989) and-J'aime d toi (1992) - and it 
seems not inappropriate to end this chapter by offering a brief interpretation of that the- 
ory. In common with the majority of Anglo-American feminist jurisprudence, Irigaray 
both asserts the universality of the subordination of women within the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition and conceives the jurisprudential representation of that subordination in 
terms of a series of binary oppositions within which the feminine is always the lesser or 
inferior element of the couplet. The starting point for Irigaray's feminist legality is 
the invocation of forgotten mythologies, cults, and creeds of the superiority of the femi- 
nine. In common with much of recent continental feminist poststructuralist theory, she 
overturns the traditional philosophical oppositions and in a series of works opposes poetry 
to prose at the level of expression, unconscious to conscious at the level of memory, 
difference to similarity at the level of method, body and energy to Christian moralism at 
the level of spirituality, and East to West at the level of metaphysical understanding. Her 
argument is here consistently libidinal, it searches for and expresses an excess of meaning, 
a beyond that transcends the political sterility of established oppositions.97 
One of the primary sources for the invocation of principles of feminine difference 
is the history of feminine deities, cults and myths of women rulers and lawgivers. Such 
mythologies exist outside the juridical boundaries of the Western tradition, they came 
before the tradition was established, they existed - in exile or exclusion - as heresies within 
the tradition, and they return either via the unconscious or from the traditions which sur- 
round the geopolitical space of Western legalism. The forms or narratives of feminine 
difference return under the signs of nature, body, and spirituality to assert the possibility 
of another order of the city and a separate law and place for women. In peculiarly concrete 
legal terms, Irigaray suggests that the first division of the law of persons should be 
between male and female and the definition and demarcation of sexual identity should be 
the first legal right insisted upon by women. It would inaugurate a series of further legal 
indications of difference: 
In Speczllzlm of the Other Woman, I wrote that to establish a political ethics, a double dialectic 
is necessary, a dialectic for the masculine subject and a dialectic for the feminine subject. 
Today, I would say that a triple dialectic is necessary: that of the masculine subject, that of 
the feminine subject, that of the relation between the two both in private and public 
 sphere^.'^ 
In legal terms the creation of a legal order that allowed the difference of the sexes and 
separated the masculine and feminine genres so as to allow their interaction would have 
to begin with the recognition and definition of female sexual identity as a form of legal 
personality: "The urgency and the simplicity of the contemporary problem of law as it 
touches upon the law of persons.. . is that all differences are valid except for the difference 
which is constitutive of sociality: sexual d i f fe ren~e ."~~ 
The argument from difference suggests not only the significance of myth, of the 
repressed, and of the other or the stranger to juridical culture, in short the value of the 
feminine legal subject, it also indicates the need for a positive definition and objective 
protection of the feminine genre: 
In the absence of civil laws positively defining their real rights and duties, women have noth- 
ing but subjective criteria to refer themselves to.. . . [TJo claim a right to subjectivity and to 
liberty for women, without defining the objective rights of the feminine genre, would seem to 
be an illusory solution to the historical hierarchy of the sexes and risks subjecting women to 
the power of an empty affirmation.. . . loo 
The definition of the civil rights of women takes various forms, but can be loosely classi- 
fied in terms of method and content. At the level of method Irigaray is concerned to resolve 
the oppositions between objective and subjective rights and to formulate the mediations 
between that and other related oppositions. Thus she suggests that a law that recognized 
and was appropriate to sexual identity would need to reconcile the universal and the par- 
ticular: the individual is both particular in their individuality, their difference, and univer- 
sal in their genre. It is in relation to the latter that the law should correspond to and 
provide for the two separate genres. Each individual's sexual identity would equally form 
the basis of a legally recognized right, both as a member of a genre and as a legal subject 
that relates to or desires members of its own and the other genre. In short the individual 
is recognized as having both an objective and a subjective identity: "The law constitutes 
an objectivity. But, if it adequately reflects the reality of the person, it must also have a 
subjective dimension. It must guarantee a subjectivity which is faithful to itself, which 
does not define itself nor alienate itself through things."lO' In addition to this legal media- 
tion of subject and object, it is also suggested and is indeed implicit in the invocation of 
myth that law needs to reconsider the relation of nature to culture and in particular to 
rethink the role of spirituality, of body, rhythm, life, and death within the social. 
In positive terms, the civil rights that the law of persons should enact are reasonably 
evident. At a mundane level Irigaray recommends four areas of objectively protected 
rights. First, a right to the physical and moral inviolability of the person, which would 
include a positively enforced civil identity, freeing each woman from the need to "con- 
stantly defend herself against rape, attack, incest, pornography and involuntary prostitu- 
tion, notably through the public representation of women's bodies and speech."'02 Second, 
a right to free maternity, free that is from financial and ideologial pressures of either a 
spiritual or a secular kind. Third, the right to a culture, to languages, religions, sciences, 
and arts - a symbolic - appropriate to feminine identity. Fourth, a preferential and recip- 
rocal right protecting the relation of mother to daughter, both physically and economi- 
cally, such as to free women from a type of "familial-conjugal i n s t i t~ t i on . " ' ~~  Only 
through such simple and urgent legal forms of protection could the legal personality and 
collective identity of the feminine have the opportunity of emerging in the full panoply 
of its difference. Despite the linguistic, cultural, and jurisdictional gulfs that separate 
continental and Anglo-American legal systems, the argument has much in common with 
certain strands of American feminist jurisprudence. The revaluation and juridical protec- 
tion of the feminine in terms both of sex and gender, body and soul, requires radical 
departures in legal method and in the substance of law.lo4 A civic or public relation 
between the sexes requires first the establishment or legal identification of the existence 
of the second sex. 
In terms finally of the substantive example of contracts pursued earlier, it is important 
to note that there was never any single law of contracts nor only one system of justice 
for those who avoided or failed to keep their promises. Feminist jurisprudence suggests a 
repressed realm of relationships which escape or are denied the status and the protection 
of contractual relations, in effect constituting what Drucilla Cornell terms a second order 
of law, a slippage from law to Law: 
The intertwinement of law with the Law {of the Father) explains why we cannot settle for 
changes in the legal system - these reforms must themselves involve a challenge to gender 
identity. Otherwise - and we have certainly lived to testify to this reality - even the most 
modest legal reforms will be undermined at every stage by the re-assertion of the Law.'OS 
Irigaray suggests one path that such a challenge to gender identity could take without 
abandoning the law to its male guardians. I t  can be added that the slippage from law to 
Law is a move from one law to another, and in classical terms the move from secular law 
to spiritual law, from law to equity, or from common law to canon law can provide a 
striking example of the revaluation of terms that a positivized and dull legal modernity 
had repressed. In terms of contracts one may note that there were both temporal and spir- 
itual dimensions to contracting and that these were reflected in separate though parallel 
systems of law. Breach of oath (laesiofidei) was a matter for the spiritual court, and an 
action would lie for breach of faith, as for perjury. Such spiritual default would be exam- 
ined according to spiritual rules and procedures and would result in a separate order of 
spiritual judgement requiring corporal penance rather than temporal restitution.lo6 
While the example of spiritual bonds may not be an especially attractive one, the example 
may nonetheless serve usefully to illustrate the possibility of different orders of law and 
separate forms of rights. One law had long mingled with another, one genre with its com- 
plement and latterly its opposite. There is in short no reason why the legal recognition of 
separate forms of personality or sexual identity should not be expressed and protected 
through distinct systems of law. 
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